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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
ROBERT A. LUCERO, : Case No. 920821-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-
2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1992) and Rule 26(2) (a) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (1992), whereby the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over appeals from a final order for anything other 
than a First Degree or Capital Felony. Lucero was convicted of 
the crime of Possession of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to 
Assault, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-10-507 (1973). 
Pursuant to Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Lucero filed a timely Notice of Appeal on February 19, 1993. A 
copy of Lucero7s Notice of Appeal is attached hereto as Addendum 
A. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-507 (1973) provides: 
Possession of deadly weapon with intent to 
assault. Every person having upon his person 
any dangerous weapon with intent to 
unlawfully assault another is guilty of a 
Class A misdemeanor. 
Rule 17(m) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 
After the jury has retired for deliberation, 
if they desire to be informed on any point of 
law arising in the cause, they shall inform 
the officer in charge of them, who shall 
communicate such request to the court. The 
court may then direct that the jury be 
brought before the court where, in the 
presence of the defendant and both counsel, 
the court shall respond to the inquiry or 
advise the jury that no further instructions 
shall be given. Such response shall be 
recorded. The court may in its discretion 
respond to the inquiry in writing without 
having the jury brought before the court, in 
which case the inquiry and the response 
thereto shall be entered in the record. 
Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or 
indictment. Upon an inquiry into the 
validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror 
may not testify as to any matter or statement 
occurring during the course of the jury's 
deliberations or to the effect of anything 
upon his or any other juror's mind or 
emotions as influencing him to assent to or 
dissent from the verdict or indictment or 
concerning his mental processes in connection 
therewith, expect that a juror may testify on 
the question whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the 
jury's attention or whether any outside 
influence was improperly brought to bear upon 
any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence 
of any statement by him concerning a matter 
about which he would be precluded from 
testifying be received for these purposes. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Was the trial judge's Supplemental Instruction 
to the jury during their deliberations an incorrect and 
misleading statement of the law that applied in the case? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the trial court's 
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factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard of review. 
However, the question of "whether these facts are sufficient to 
demonstrate reliability is a question of law, which [this Court] 
review[s] for correctness." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 
(Utah 1991); see also State v. Mincv, 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 21 
(Utah App. 1992). 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial judge err in communicating with 
the jury during their deliberations in violation of Rule 17(m) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the trial court's 
factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard of review. 
However, the question of "whether these facts are sufficient to 
demonstrate reliability is a question of law, which [this court] 
review[s] for correctness." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 
(Utah 1991); see also State v. Mincv, 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 21 
(Utah App. 1992). 
Issue No. 3: Did the trial judge err in refusing to 
consider the affidavit of a juror in ruling on Lucero's Motion 
for a New Trial, which affidavit provides testimony regarding 
extraneous prejudicial information that was improperly brought to 
the jury's attention by the trial judge's unauthorized 
communication? 
Standard of Review. This court reviews the trial court's 
factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard of review. 
However, the question of "whether these facts are sufficient to 
demonstrate reliability is a question of law, which [this Court] 
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review[s] for correctness." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 
(Utah 1991); see also State v. Mincy, 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 21 
(Utah App. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In an Information, dated August 5, 1992, the State charged 
Appellant, Robert Lucero, with one count of Possession of a 
Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault, a Class A misdemeanor, one 
count of Speeding, a Class C misdemeanor, and one count of Faulty 
Equipment, an Infraction. R. 1-3. The Faulty Equipment charge 
was dismissed upon Lucero's motion and the charges of Possession 
of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault and Speeding were sent 
to the jury following the conclusion of the case. T. 125-129.2 
On October 2, 1992, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the 
charge of Possession of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault, a 
Class A misdemeanor and Speeding, a Class C misdemeanor. R. 108-
109, T. 184. On October 30, 1992, Lucero was sentenced to one year 
jail plus a $2,000 fine and $150 attorney recoupment fee. R. 113-
118. The court suspended 360 days of the jail and $1,000 of the 
fine upon eighteen months probation. R 113-118. On January 13, 
1993 the Court of Appeals granted Lucero's Petition for Certificate 
of Probable Cause, staying the imposition of the Circuit Court's 
sentence pending this appeal. R. 159. 
1
 All citations to the transcript of the Jury Trial held on 
October 2, 1992 shall be designated as "T." 
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On November 6, 1992, Lucero filed a Motion for a New Trial 
and a Memorandum in Support of Motion for a New Trial. R. 119-
12 9, 135-136. A copy of Lucero's Motion and Memorandum are 
attached hereto as Addendum B. As additional support for 
Lucero's Motion for New Trial, Lucero filed the Affidavit of 
Barbara Brown, a juror. R. 130-132. A copy of the Affidavit of 
Barbara Brown ("Brown Affidavit") is attached hereto as Addendum 
C. 
On November 12, 1992, a hearing was held on Lucero's Motion 
for a New Trial. MT. 1-13.2. 
On February 5, 1993, the trial judge signed an order denying 
Lucero's Motion for a New Trial. A copy of the order denying 
Lucero's Motion for a New Trial ("Order") is attached hereto as 
Addendum D. 
On February 5, 1993, the trial judge signed a Judgment and 
Sentence which set forth the conditions of Lucero's sentence and 
terms of probation. A copy of the Judgment and Sentence is 
attached hereto as Addendum E. 
On February 19, 1993, Lucero filed a Notice of Appeal3 
wherein Lucero appealed his conviction for Possession of a Deadly 
2
 All citations to the transcript of the hearing on Lucero's 
Motion for New Trial held on November 12, 1992 shall be 
designated as "MT." 
3Lucero had previously filed a Notice of Appeal on December 
11, 1992, which Notice of Appeal was ineffective since it was 
filed prior to the filing of a written Judgment and Sentence as 
well as Order Denying Lucero's Motion for a New Trial. R. 149-
150. Therefore, the Notice of Appeal filed on February 19, 1993, 
was required to perfect Lucero's appeal. 
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Weapon with Intent to Assault. Lucero has chosen not to appeal 
his conviction for Speeding. See Addendum A. 
The substance of the charge that Lucero unlawfully possessed 
a deadly weapon with intent to assault, was that Lucero had upon 
his person a dangerous weapon (i.e., screwdriver) with the intent 
to unlawfully assault another. R. 1-3, 56. The jury was fully 
instructed on the elements of the offense. R. 56. A copy of 
Jury Instruction No. 15, which sets forth the elements of the 
offense of Possession of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault, 
is attached hereto as Addendum F. All Jury Instructions were in 
writing and were sent into the jury room to aid their 
deliberations. R. 39-63, T. 143-155. 
Subsequent to the jury's indication to the court that they 
were having difficulty reaching a unanimous decision, the court 
further instructed the jury on the crime of Possession of a 
Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault. R. Ill, T. 178, 181-182. 
This supplemental instruction was the result of the following 
question and answer: 
JURY'S QUESTION: Is intent against the law? 
COURT'S ANSWER: It is illegal to possess a deadly 
weapon with intent to assault. Intent without a deadly 
weapon is not illegal. 
R. Ill, T. 181-182. The above answer to the jury's question 
shall hereafter be referred to as the "Supplemental Instruction." 
The Supplemental Instruction on the elements of the crime of 
Possession of a Deadly Weapon With Intent to Assault, was given 
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without consultation with Lucero, Lucero's counsel or the 
prosecutor. T. 181-182. The trial court's Supplemental 
Instruction was submitted to the jury without discussion. R. 
Ill, T. 181-182. 
Lucero filed a Motion for a New Trial objecting to the trial 
judge's Supplemental Instruction. R. 119-129, 135-136. See 
Addendums B and C. The trial court denied Lucero's Motion for a 
New Trial and further held that the Brown Affidavit was an 
improper invasion of the jury's deliberative process. MT. 10. 
See Order paragraphs 1 and 3. The trial court also held that the 
trial judge's ex parte communication with the jury during the 
jury's deliberations was not an improper communication with the 
jury and did not violate Rule 17(m) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. MT. 10. See Order paragraph 2. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about July 14, 1992, Lucero was accused of Possession 
of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault. R. 1-3. It was 
established at trial that Lucero was in possession of a 
screwdriver, which screwdriver the state alleged constituted a 
deadly weapon. T. 60, 69, 99-100, 104, 106, 157-158. Lucero did 
not challenge the state's characterization of the screwdriver as 
a deadly weapon. T. 69, 163. Instead, Lucero challenged the 
state's allegation that he had possessed this screwdriver with 
the intent to assault Deputy Taylor. T. 69-71, 76, 79-80, 110-
111, 163-171. 
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Deputy Winters testified at trial that he did not know 
Lucero's intent at the time he was possessing the screwdriver, 
nor did he see Lucero attempt to assault Deputy Taylor. T. 69-
72, 76, 79-80. Deputy Taylor testified that he felt that Lucero 
was about to assault him with the screwdriver. T. 100, 110-111, 
121-123. However, Deputy Taylor further testified that at the 
time the alleged crime occurred that Lucero's demeanor had 
changed and he no longer appeared as agitated nor as angry as he 
had previous to his picking up the screwdriver. T. 103, 111. 
Lucero was not charged with an assault but was only charged with 
Possession of a Deadly Weapon with an Intent to Assault. T. 110, 
123. 
Lucero's counsel conceded in his closing argument that 
Lucero was in possession of the screwdriver. T. 163. Lucero's 
counsel stressed in closing argument that there was no intent on 
the part of Lucero to assault anyone, either Deputy Taylor or 
Deputy Winters. T. 163-169, 171. Lucero's counsel argued that if 
anything, the possession of the screwdriver was a defensive 
posture on behalf of Lucero who had previously been pushed by 
Deputy Winters. T. 71, 103, 163-171. Deputy Taylor further 
testified that if Lucero was mad at anyone, his anger was 
directed towards Deputy Winters, not himself. T. 103. However, 
the alleged intent to assault was directed towards Deputy Taylor, 
according to the state. R. 1-3. 
After the receipt of all evidence, arguments of counsel and 
the jury being instructed by the trial judge on the law that 
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applied, the jury retired for its deliberations. T. 41-176. 
Each juror was provided with a copy of the Jury Instructions as 
they were read by the trial judge. T. 143. Each juror was 
allowed to take their set of the written Jury Instructions into 
the jury room to consult during their deliberations. T. 143, 
175. Jury Instruction No. 15 set forth the elements for the 
crime of Possession of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault. 
R. 56, T. 152-153. See Addendum E. The jury was also provided 
with written Verdict Forms. R. 108-109. The Verdict Forms were 
not read into the record nor described by the trial judge. T. 
154. 
Throughout the jury's deliberations, the jury sent questions 
to the trial court. R. 110-111, T. 176-183. The first inquiry 
to the court involved a series of four questions. R. 110, T. 
176-177. Prior to answering these four questions, the trial 
judge called Mr. Lucero, his attorney and the prosecutor into the 
courtroom and on the record read the jury's questions along with 
the trial judge's proposed answers to those questions. T. 176-
177. All parties were allowed input into the trial judge's 
answers as well as the opportunity to object to any proposed 
answer prior to those answers being submitted to the jury. T. 
176-177. The trial judge wrote the agreed upon answers to the 
jury's first inquiry on the same sheet of paper that contained 
the written questions and returned it to the jury at 
approximately 5:35 p.m. R. 110, T. 176-177. 
Approximately one hour into the jury's deliberations, a 
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second note was sent to the trial judge stating that the jury 
could not reach a unanimous decision and asked what they were to 
do next. R. Ill, T. 177-179. Again, the court called Mr. 
Lucero, his attorney and the prosecutor into the courtroom and on 
the record read the jury's question along with the trial judge's 
proposed answer. R. Ill, T. 177-179. The court's proposed 
answer was "you must continue to discuss and analyze the evidence 
you have heard." R.lll, T. 177-179. Following a discussion on 
the record, the trial judge's proposed answer was sent to the 
jury at approximately 5:49 p.m. R. Ill, T. 177-179. 
Following the trial judge's answering the jury's second 
question, the possibility of dinner for the jury as well as 
allowing the prosecutor to leave the court building to get dinner 
was discussed. T. 179-181. It was decided that all parties 
would be given approximately twenty-minutes to retrieve dinner 
and return to the court by 6:10 p.m. T. 180. 
The jury sent a third question to the trial judge, asking if 
they could have Officer Winter's testimony. R. 111. The trial 
judge answered that, "you must rely upon your memory with the 
assistance of your notes." R. 111. The answer was sent to the 
jury at approximately 5:57 p.m. without consulting Mr. Lucero, 
his attorney or the prosecutor. R. Ill, T. 181. 
The jury sent a fourth question to the trial judge. R. Ill, 
T. 181-182. The jury's question and the trial judge's answer was 
as follows: 
JURY'S QUESTION: Is intent against the law? 
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COURT'S ANSWER: It is illegal to possess a deadly 
weapon with intent to assault. Intent without a deadly 
weapon is not illegal. 
R. Ill, T. 181-182. This Supplemental Instruction was sent to 
the jury at approximately 6:09 p.m. without consulting Mr. 
Lucero, his attorney, or the prosecutor. R. Ill, T. 181-182. 
Subsequently, the trial judge called Mr. Lucero, his 
attorney and the prosecutor into the courtroom to place on the 
record the jury's third and fourth questions along with the trial 
judge's ex parte answers. T. 181-183. The trial judge indicated 
on the record that the Supplemental Instruction was sent to the 
jury on the trial judge's own initiative and that the 
Supplemental Instruction was never discussed or presented to Mr. 
Lucero, his attorney or the prosecutor prior to being submitted 
to the jury. T. 181-182. 
A discussion was held on the record regarding the trial 
judge's ex parte Supplemental Instruction of the jury, wherein 
Lucero's counsel indicated to the court that he had some concern 
that the answer did not specifically require an intent to 
assault. T. 181-182. In response to this specific concern the 
trial judge responded that, "I assume that's what they're talking 
about is intent to assault." T. 181-182. 
Again, Lucero's counsel expressed his concern that the trial 
judge's answer was confusing by stating that, "tt]he answer to 
[that question] I think would have been much clearer if it would 
have been intent to assault with a deadly weapon is a crime." T. 
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182. A brief discussion followed wherein the prosecutor and 
trial judge indicated that it had been their assumption that 
since intent to assault had been referred to in a portion of the 
trial judge's Supplemental Instruction, that the jury would 
assume that it applied in the last sentence wherein the court 
merely stated that, fI[i]ntent without a deadly weapon is not 
illegal," T. 182. The issue as to how the jury's question 
should have been answered was left unresolved. T. 182. 
Shortly after the jury had received the Supplemental 
Instruction, the trial judge was notified that the jury had 
reached a decision. T. 183. The jury was returned to the 
courtroom and informed the court that it had reached a verdict of 
guilty and that the verdict was unanimous. T. 184. The Verdict 
Form signed by the jury foreman stated that, "We, the jurors in 
the above case, find the defendant 'GUILTY' OF: POSSESSION OF 
DEADLY WEAPON." R. 108. A copy of the Verdict Form is attached 
hereto as Addendum G. The trial judge read the jury's verdict 
and in so doing read that ff[w]e, the jurors in the above case, 
find the defendant guilty of possession of a deadly weapon with 
intent to assault." T. 184. 
Prior to receipt of the court's Supplemental Instruction, 
the jury had been unable to reach a unanimous decision. R. 110, 
T. 177-178. At least one juror was of the opinion that the trial 
judge, through his Supplemental Instruction, was directing the 
jury how to decide. MT. 2-10. See Brown Affidavit. That based 
upon the trial judge's Supplemental Instruction, the jury 
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concluded that intent to possess a deadly weapon was enough and 
no longer discussed the issue of whether or not Mr. Lucero had 
intended to assault another person. MT. 2-10. See Brown 
Affidavit, paragraphs 11 and 13. It was only after the receipt 
of the trial judge's Supplemental Instruction, that the jury was 
able to reach a unanimous verdict of guilty. See Brown 
Affidavit, paragraph 14. 
On November 6, 1992, Lucero filed a timely Motion for New 
Trial based on the grounds that the jury was improperly 
instructed on the law that applied and that the trial judge had 
improperly communicated with the jury in violation of Rule 17(m) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. R. 119-132, 135-136. 
See Addendum B and C. The trial court denied Lucero7s Motion for 
a New Trial. MT. 10. See Addendum D 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial judge's Supplemental Instruction to the jury 
during their deliberations was given in violation of Rule 17(m) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. When the safeguards 
intended by Rule 17(m) are violated, a presumption of prejudice 
is raised and the burden is shifted to the prosecution to rebut 
that presumption. Furthermore, the Supplemental Instruction 
cannot be shown beyond a reasonable doubt to have been a harmless 
intrusion upon the jury's deliberative process. 
Not only was the communication with the jury inappropriate, 
but the Supplemental Instruction was an incorrect statement of 
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the law. The jury had previously been fully instructed upon the 
elements of the offense of Possession of a Deadly Weapon with 
Intent to Assault. See Instruction No. 15. (Addendum F). The 
trial judge's explanation and the prosecutor's argument that it 
assumed that what was being referred to was "intent to assault" 
is insufficient to rebut the presumption of prejudice raised by 
such contact. Since the jury could have been asking something 
different and since the trial judge's answer could logically have 
been interpreted as deleting an essential element of the crime, 
the trial judge's Supplemental Instruction was an incorrect 
statement of law and obviously confusing to the jury. Especially 
when coupled with the Verdict Form submitted to the jury which 
only referred to "Possession of Deadly Weapon." Therefore, 
Lucero was entitled to a new trial and it was error for the trial 
court to deny Lucero's timely motion. 
The trial judge's communication with the jury in violation 
of the safeguards of Rule 17(m) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure was per se unauthorized. Therefore, the jury received 
extraneous prejudicial information which could have effected the 
jury's verdict. When such extraneous prejudicial information is 
an issue involved in the challenge of a jury's verdict, it is 
appropriate for the court to consider juror's affidavits in 
assessing the impact of the extraneous prejudicial information. 
The Brown Affidavit regarding the impact of the trial judge's 
Supplemental Instruction (i.e., extraneous prejudicial 
information) was admissible under the evidentiary rule providing 
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that a juror may testify on the question of whether extraneous 
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's 
attention or whether any outside influences are brought to bear 
upon any juror. 
Thus, it was error for the trial court not to consider the 
Brown Affidavit in determining whether or not the trial judge's 
unauthorized Supplemental Instruction could be shown to be 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This court should consider 
the Brown Affidavit, which establishes obvious prejudice to Mr. 
Lucero, and reverse the trial court's denial of Lucero's Motion 
for a New Trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT IMPROPERLY COMMUNICATED WITH THE JURY IN VIOLATION 
OF RULE 17 (m) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND SUCH 
COMMUNICATION WAS PREJUDICIAL TO MR, LUCERO. 
A, The safeguards afforded Mr. Lucero were 
circumvented by the trial judge's unauthorized 
communication with the jury. 
At all times prior to the trial judge's submission of it's 
Supplemental Instruction to the jury, the trial judge properly 
called Mr. Lucero, his counsel and the prosecutor into the 
courtroom and discussed on the record proposed answers to the 
jury's inquiries. The proper procedure for instructing the jury 
is set forth in Rule 17(m) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and is as follows: 
After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they 
desire to be informed on any point of law arising in 
the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of 
them, who shall communicate such request to the court. 
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The court may then direct that the jury be brought 
before the court where, in the presence of the 
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to 
the inquiry or advise the jury that no further 
instructions shall be given. Such response shall be 
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to 
the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought 
before the court, in which case the inquiry and the 
response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
The safeguards mandated by Rule 17(m) of allowing the defendant 
and both counsel an opportunity to object to any further 
instruction of the jury was circumvented in this case by the 
trial judge's unilateral Supplemental Instruction of the jury. 
Rule 17(m) does not specifically reiterate the safeguards 
set forth in the body of the rule following the alternative of 
responding in writing to jury inquiries. However, the logical 
reading of the Rule mandates that all safeguards apply, 
regardless of whether the trial judge consults the jury in the 
courtroom or decides to communicate with the jury in writing. 
The policy concerns are the same regardless of how the response 
is communicated to the jury. Furthermore, the importance of 
allowing the defendant and both counsel an opportunity to 
challenge the court's proposed answers applies equally to written 
communications and in-court communications. 
This case illustrates the importance of the safeguards 
mandated in Rule 17(m), in that, had Mr. Lucero and both counsel 
been consulted prior to the unauthorized communication by the 
trial judge, Mr. Lucero's express concerns over the confusing 
nature of the trial judge's Supplemental Instruction could have 
been resolved -- making this appeal unnecessary. However, at the 
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time Lucero and his counsel were informed of the trial judge's 
communication, the jury had already been improperly instructed. 
Therefore, Lucero was required to proceed through a Motion for a 
New Trial to correct the impact of the extraneous prejudicial 
communication. 
B. The state has failed to rebut the presumption of 
prejudice raised by the trial judged unauthorized 
communication. 
Those courts addressing the issue of the trial court's 
communication with the jury during their deliberations uniformly 
require that appropriate and adequate safeguards must be taken 
and that the instructions must properly state the law.4 
Recognizing the necessity of supplemental instructions to the 
jury during their deliberations, courts have developed rules 
safeguarding those communications as well as a specific standard 
of review when those communications do not comply with the 
safeguards established. 
In State v. Fletcher, 717 P.2d 866 (Ariz. 1986) the Supreme 
Court of Arizona cited long-time precedents that "it is 
reversible error for a trial judge in a criminal case to 
communicate with the jurors after they have retired to deliberate 
unless the defendant and counsel have been notified and given an 
opportunity to be present." State v. Fletcher, 717 P.2d at 870 
4No Utah case law specifically addressing' the scope and 
requirements of Rule 17(m) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
exists. However, the cases cited in this section of Lucero's brief 
rely on statutes similar to Rule 17 (m) as a basis for their 
analysis. 
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[citations omitted]. Noting that the trial judge's actions were 
strongly disapproved of, the Fletcher court stated that, "[t]he 
test of whether erroneous jury communications require reversal is 
whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was not prejudiced by the communication." Id. See 
People v. Woodward, 631 P.2d 1188 (Colo. App. 1981) (instructions 
given must properly state the law). 
All courts which have addressed this issue seem to follow 
the Fletcher analysis, however, most courts have found that the 
unauthorized communication was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
based upon the appellate court's analysis of the nature of the 
communication and it's effect upon the jury. See e.g.. State v. 
Fletcher, 717 P.2d 866 (Ariz. 1986) (even though court's 
supplemental instruction was error, it was found to be harmless 
since the instruction did not misstate the law) ; Cavanaucrh v. 
State, 729 P. 2d 481 (Nev. 1986) (while the court's answering 
without notice to counsel was error, the error was harmless since 
the instruction was correct); Fisher v. State, 736 P.2d 1003 
(Okl. Cir. 1987) (presumption of prejudice was overcome since 
court's unauthorized communication involved the court merely 
returning the question to the jury indicating that it would not 
answer); State v. Allen, 749 P.2d 702 (Wash. App. 1988) (trial 
court's improper response to jury's inquiry without contacting 
defendant or defendant's attorney, was harmless where the court 
merely told the jury to read the instructions and continue with 
deliberations); People v. Leonardo, 687 P.2d 511 (Colo. App. 
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1984) (court found harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, 
since defendant was not prejudiced by trial court's answer 
referring jury to instructions already given); State v. Koch, 673 
P.2d 297 (Ariz. 1983) (reversal is not required if it can be said 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not prejudiced 
by improper communications between judge and jury) and State v. 
Sammons, 749 P.2d 1372 (Ariz. 1988) (unauthorized written 
communication which added nothing was harmless error beyond a 
reasonable doubt). 
The above cases all adhere to the general rule that it is 
prejudicial error for the trial court to communicate with the 
jury without previously consulting with the defendant and 
counsel. Furthermore, they require that when an unauthorized 
communication occurs the burden is placed on the State to show 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the unauthorized communication was 
harmless. Most courts which have addressed this issue, as 
illustrated above, have involved refusals to answer by the trial 
judge or a referral to the jury instructions. However, when the 
trial judge's unauthorized communication involves more than a no-
answer or an answer directing the jury to consult what it already 
has, the determination of error is much more difficult. 
When the trial judge's unauthorized communication with the 
jury misstates the law, comments on the facts, or would tend to 
be confusing to the jury; reversible error is typically found. 
Once an unauthorized communication has occurred, the focus of the 
court is on the type of action taken by the court in the 
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defendant's absence, not the propriety of that action. Jones v. 
State, 719 P.2d 265, 267 (Alaska App. 1986). Emphasizing the 
importance of following appropriate safeguards, the Court of 
Appeals of Alaska stated the following: 
A defendant has a constitutional right to be present at 
every stage of the trial and to be notified of any 
communication from the jury. Failure to notify the 
defendant of a jury communication is constitutional 
error that requires reversal on appeal unless the error 
is found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, 
the state bears the burden of proving the error 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt... [T]he error 
occurs in not allowing the defendant to offer comments, 
suggestions, and objections to guide the substance and 
phrasing of the court's response to the jury. 
Jones v. State, 719 P.2d at 266-267 [citations omitted]. 
Applying the general requirements set forth above, the Jones 
Court noted that although the evidence against Jones was strong; 
his defense, in part, was that he did not exert sufficient 
control over the allegedly stolen property to be guilty of theft. 
The Jones' court indicated that since the jury's inquiry was 
about the definition of "exert control," that the court must 
assume that the jury believed that definition was important to 
its resolution of the case. Therefore, the trial court's answer 
which "merely restated the jury instructions" was insufficient in 
that it did not attempt to clarify an area where the jury was 
obviously confused. Id. 
As the court in Jones indicated it may be necessary for the 
trial judge to answer, other than simply referring the jury to 
the instructions, when it is obvious that they're confused on 
some point. Id. However, as the Jones' court aptly points out, 
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error occurs in not allowing the defendant to offer comments, 
suggestions, and objections to guide the substance and phrasing 
of the court's response to the jury. Id. 
In Mr. Lucero's case, the jury's question regarding "intent" 
may have indicated that they were confused as to what the intent 
element required -- for example, intent to assault only; intent 
to possess a deadly weapon only; or, both intents simultaneously. 
The trial judge's Supplemental Instruction only confused the 
issue of intent. Especially, given the Verdict Form which 
allowed them to find Mr. Lucero guilty of "Possession of Deadly 
Weapon." See Addendum G. 
It may have been appropriate in Mr. Lucero's case to merely 
refer the jury to Instruction No. 15, which sets forth the 
elements of the crime. See Addendum F. At minimum, an open 
discussion with Mr. Lucero and counsel could have resolved the 
issue. 
The trial judge committed reversible error by giving the 
Supplemental Instruction that allowed the jury to conclude that a 
uniformity of an intent to possess and an intent to assault was 
not required for conviction of the crime of "Possession of Deadly 
Weapon." See Addendum G. See e.g. Leonardo v. People, 728 P.2d 
1252 (Colo. 1986) (constitutional error occurred as a result of 
trial judge's failure to obtain presence of defendant's attorney 
when the trial judge responded to jury's question whether 
"knowing or believing" for purpose of theft by receiving meant 
same as "having suspicion of" because it could have affected the 
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verdict and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the 
question indicated serious misunderstanding with regard to 
culpable mental state required); (State v. McCarter, 604 P.2d 
1242 (N.M. 1980) (response to message from jury indicating they 
were having difficulty reaching a unanimous decision in light of 
defendant's absence when message was received and response that 
"you must consider further deliberations" was error requiring a 
new trial); Hovev v. State, 726 P.2d 344 (N.M. 1986) (state 
failed to meet burden of proof to overcome presumption of 
prejudicial error as a result of improper communications, where 
state made no effort to demonstrate the jury's verdict was not 
affected by trial court's communication) and State v. Bretz, 590 
P.2d 614 (Mont. 1979) (court's material variance of a previous 
instruction without consultation with the defendant or either 
counsel required reversal). 
II, THE TRIAL JUDGED SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION WAS AN INCORRECT 
STATEMENT OF THE LAW THAT APPLIED IN THE CASE AND CONSTITUTES 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
It is axiomatic that any instruction to the jury must be a 
correct statement of law and when instructing on a particular 
crime must contain all essential elements for the commission of 
the crime. See State v. Anderson, 498 P.2d 295, 299 (Mont. 1972) 
(jury instruction was incorrect statement of law and confusing to 
jury, therefore, defendant was entitled to a new trial); State v. 
Byers, 768 P.2d 414 (Ore. App. 1989) (defendant was entitled to a 
new trial based on error in a verdict form submitted to jury 
which incorrectly stated one element of the substantive crime) 
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and State v. Cathey, 741 P.2d 738 (Kan. 1987) (jury instructions 
which are erroneous and misleading can constitute grounds for a 
new trial). 
The trial judge's answer to the jury's inquiry as to whether 
intent was against the law was an incorrect statement of the law. 
The trial judge neglected to clearly outline to the jury the 
additional requirement that "intent to assault" must also be 
established. The trial judge's Supplemental Instruction allowed 
the jury to determine guilt based solely upon an intent to 
possess a deadly weapon; thus, misleading the jury as to all 
essential elements required. See Brown affidavit. The trial 
judge's incorrect and confusing Supplemental Instruction is 
particularly troublesome given the Verdict Form signed by the 
jury. See Addendum G. 
The prosecution has alleged that the context of the trial 
judge's answer was clear. The prosecution claims that even 
though the trial judge dropped the reference to "intent to 
assault" in it's final pronouncement of the law, it is not 
confusing because "intent to assault" was mentioned above and 
therefore is inferred below. Yet, even the trial judge was not 
clear on the import of his answer. For example, when confronted 
with the omission of "intent to assault" the trial judge replied 
that, "I assume that's what they're talking about is intent to 
assault." 
Adding to the confusion, is the fact that the trial judge's 
Supplemental Instruction was stated in the negative. Transferring 
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that answer to an affirmative statement of the law results in 
"intent and a deadly weapon is illegal." Thus, leading the jury 
to conclude that intent to possess a deadly weapon was sufficient 
for conviction. See Brown Affidavit, paragraphs 11 and 13. And, 
resulted in their signing the Verdict Form finding Lucero guilty 
of "Possession of Deadly Weapon." R. 111. 
The correctness of the trial judge's Supplemental 
Instruction must be evaluated from the perspective that the 
burden is upon the state to prove the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See Point I, above. The state has argued that 
given the totality of the circumstances and all of the Jury 
Instructions read together, that the Supplemental Instruction was 
not misleading or confusing to the jury. However, as the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in United 
States v. McDaniel, the proper question is what could the jury 
have been asking by their question, not what the court may assume 
they were asking. United States v. McDaniel, 545 F.2d 642, 644 
(9th Cir. 1976) . 
The McDaniel court reasoned as follows: 
During the deliberations, the jury sent the court a 
note asking, 'Can an individual aid and abet the crime 
without knowledge that a crime is being committed?7 
The court sent back the answer, 'Yes7. This was error. 
Presumably, the court interpreted the jury's question 
as asking whether the aider and abetter must know that 
the activity was a crime. It is true that ignorance of 
the law is no excuse, but the jury's question was not 
that simple. The jury could have been asking whether 
Barbara could be guilty of aiding or abetting without 
knowing that Ulysses was committing the various 
forbidden elements of the principal crime, not whether 
she knew those acts to be illegal. 
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United States v. McDaniel, 545 F.2d at 644 [Emphasis added]. The 
McDaniel court held that the trial judge's answer to the jury's 
question could have caused the jury to disregard the requisite 
scienter element and therefore inappropriately convict the 
defendant. 
A similar result is possible in Mr. Lucero's case. The 
jury's question "is intent against the law?", was phrased in such 
a manner that the real purpose or thrust of the question is 
difficult to determine. The jury could have been asking whether 
intent to possess a deadly weapon, alone, was against the law --
as the Verdict Form seemed to imply. See Addendum G. Or, 
perhaps the jury was asking whether some additional overt acts 
were required in addition to the subjective intent to commit an 
assault while possessing a deadly weapon. Regardless of the 
jury's intention in asking their question, the trial judge's 
assumption that they were asking one specific question versus 
other viable questions points to the reversible error that was 
committed. See United States v. McDaniel, 545 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 
1976). 
Courts which have found harmless error involved 
circumstances where the judge's response to a question was 
legally correct and suggested no additional or improper meaning. 
State v. Frederick, 648 P.2d 925, 927 (Wash. App. 1982). But, 
when an ambiguous question is involved and the trial judge's 
response is legally incorrect under one interpretation, the 
result is that reversible error has been committed. United 
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States v. McDaniel. 545 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1976). The Lucero case 
is analogous to the McDaniel case. Both involved ambiguous 
questions. 
The trial judge's Supplemental Instruction to the jury's 
ambiguous question of "is intent against the law?" was clearly 
erroneous and prejudicial. See Brown Affidavit. Therefore, Mr. 
Lucero is entitled to a new trial. 
III. THE BROWN AFFIDAVIT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMITTED TO SHOW THAT 
EXTRANEOUS PREJUDICIAL INFORMATION WAS IMPROPERLY BROUGHT TO THE 
JURY'S ATTENTION. 
Juror affidavits are generally inadmissible for the purpose 
of impeaching their verdict. Johnson v. Simons, 551 P.2d 515 
(Utah 1976). Yet, the adoption of Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence provides an exception to the general rule. Hillier v. 
Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300 (Utah App. 1987). In Hillier the Utah 
Court of Appeals noted that under Utah Rules of Evidence 606(b) 
"a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous 
prejudicial inFormation was improperly brought to the jury's 
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought 
to bear upon any juror." Id. at 305. 
Since the trial judge failed to comply with Rule 17(m) 
safeguards, the communication with the jury (i.e. Supplemental 
Instruction) was unauthorized. And, as such, constitutes 
extraneous prejudicial information that was improperly brought to 
the jury's attention. Therefore, the Brown Affidavit is 
admissible on the issue of whether or not the Supplemental 
Instruction (i.e., extraneous information) was "prejudicial." 
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See Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d at 305. 
In applying Rule 606(b), the Hillier court concluded that a 
dictionary was "extraneous information." Id. It went on to hold 
that because a question existed as to whether or not use of the 
dictionary was "prejudicial," juror affidavits were admissible 
under Rule 606(b). Id. 
In Lucero the ex parte unauthorized communication with the 
jury was "extraneous information." Since a question exists as to 
whether or not use of the Supplemental Instruction was 
"prejudicial," the Brown Affidavit is admissible under Rule 
606(b). See Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300 (Utah App. 1987). 
A review of the Brown Affidavit clearly indicates that the 
Supplemental Instruction was extraneous information that was 
highly "prejudicial." Therefore, this Court should reverse the 
trial court's denial of Mr. Lucero's Motion for a New Trial and 
remand this case to the Circuit Court for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Lucero requests that this court reverse the trial court's 
order denying Lucero's Motion for a New Trial and remand the case 
for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this / v day of M^y7~i993. 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON' 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, PATRICK L. ANDERSON, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court 
of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84102 and two copies to C. Dane Nolan, Salt Lake 
County Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
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ADDENDUM A 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON, #4787 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY CITY DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ROBERT A. LUCERO, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 921002876MS 
JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNE 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that ROBERT A. LUCERO, defendant in 
the above-entitled action, hereby appeals to the Utah Court of 
Appeals in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, from the 
Judgment and Sentence entered on February 5, 1993 and Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial entered on February 5, 1993 by 
the Honorable William A. Thome. 
,rA 
DATED this H day of February-) 1993. 
VTRICK L. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON, #4787 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ROBERT A. LUCERO, 
Defendant. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
App. Case No. 930107-CA 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOEY FINOCCHIO, hereby certify that on February 22, 
19931, I have caused a copy of the Notice of Appeal attached hereto 
to be delivered to the South Valley County Attorneys Office, 2001 
South State, Suite S3700, Salt Lake City, Utah 8419jtf"-1200. 
DATED this _2 day of March, ,1993. 
DELIVERED/MAILED this J£_ day of March, 1993. 
U Cx^ • W v s i 
ADDENDUM B 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, 
424 East 500 South Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 





MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 921002876 
HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THORNE 
Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, the defendant, ROBERT LUCERO, hereby moves this court for 
an order granting the defendant a new trial in the above-referenced 
case. This motion is based on the ground that the jury was 
improperly instructed on the law that applied in this case. 
Furthermore, this motion is further based upon the ground that the 
court improperly communicated with the jury in violation of Rule 
17(m) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
The grounds for this motion are more fully set forth in the 
accompanying Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial and the 
Affidavit of Barbara Brown 
DATED this (p day of Novembej^ 1992. 
>ATRICK L. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the South 
Valley County Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84190-1200 this day of November, 1992. 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
ROBERT LUCERO, : Case No. 921002876 
: HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THORNE 
Defendant. 
The defendant, ROBERT LUCERO, hereby submits the following 
Memorandum in Support of his Motion for a New Trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The above-referenced case was tried before a jury on 
October 2, 1992. 
2. After the receipt of all evidence and the jury being 
instructed by the court on the law that applied in this case, the 
jury retired for itfs deliberations. 
3. The jury was allowed to take a copy of all of the jury 
instructions with them to aid their deliberations. 
4. The jury instructions contained an elements instruction 
for the crime of Possession of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to 
Assault. See Instruction No. 15. 
5. That throughout the jury's deliberations, the jury sent 
questions to the court. 
6. Prior to answering most of the questions submitted to 
the court by the jury, the court called the defendant and his 
attorney, along with the prosecutor before the court and announced 
the jury's questions on the record, along with the court's proposed 
answers to those questions. 
7. All answers which were ultimately given to the jury, as 
referred to in paragraph 6 above, were discussed by all parties and 
approved by the defendant, defendant's counsel and the prosecutor. 
8. That approximately one hour into the jury's 
deliberations they sent a note to the court stating that they could 
not reach a unanimous decision and asked what to do next. 
9. After discussion with the defendant, the defendant's 
counsel and the prosecutor, the court sent an answer into the jury 
asking them to "continue to discuss it and see if you can reach a 
decision." 
10. The answer referred to in paragraph 9 above, was 
submitted to the jury after the approval of the defendant, the 
defendant's counsel and the prosecutor. 
11. At some point during the jury's deliberations, the 
court discussed with the defendant, defendant's counsel and the 
prosecutor, the possibility of dinner for the jury as well as 
allowing the prosecutor to leave the court building for a period of 
twenty minutes to get dinner and bring it back to the court. 
12. It was decided that the prosecutor would be given a 
period of twenty minutes to leave the court and return with dinner. 
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13. Upon the prosecutor's return to the court, the 
defendant, the defendant's counsel and the prosecutor were called 
into the court to discuss what had happened during the prosecutor's 
absence, 
14. The defendant, defendant's counsel and the prosecutor 
were informed by the court that the court had received two 
additional questions while the prosecutor was gone. 
15. The court indicated to the defendant, defendant's 
counsel and the prosecutor that the court had already answered the 
questions referred to in paragraph 14 above, and that it was now the 
court's intention to put those questions and answers on the record. 
16. The court's answers referred to in paragraph 14 above, 
were sent to the jury on the court's own initiative and the answers 
were never discussed or presented to the defendant, defendant's 
counsel or the prosecutor prior to being submitted to the jury. 
17. That one of the questions referred to in paragraph 14 
above, was: "Is intent against the law?" 
18. The court informed the defendant, defendant's counsel 
and the prosecutor, that the court had without consultation, 
submitted the following answer to the question set forth in 
paragraph 17 above: "It is illegal to possess a deadly weapon with 
intent to assault. Intent without a deadly weapon is not illegal." 
19. At the time the defendant, defendant's counsel and the 
prosecutor were informed of the court's answer set forth in 
paragraph 18 above, the answer had already been submitted to the 
jury without the opportunity for the defendant, defendant's counsel 
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or the prosecutor to either object to or approve the court's new 
instruction. 
20. That at the time the court informed the defendant, 
defendant's counsel and the prosecutor of it's actions, counsel for 
the defendant indicated to the court that he had some concern that 
the answer did not specifically require an intent to assault. 
21. That in response to the defendant's counsel's concerns 
mentioned in paragraph 20 above, the court responded: "[I] assumed 
what we're talking [about] was intent to assault." The court then 
asked if anyone wanted anything put on the record. 
22. In response to the court's inquiry set forth in 
paragraph 21 above, the defendant's counsel asked, "Have you already 
answered their question?" To which the court responded, "I have." 
23. In response to the court's affirmation of the timing 
of the instruction being sent to the jury as referred to in 
paragraph 22 above, the defendant's counsel expressed his concern 
that the court's answer was confusing by stating, "The answer to 
[that question] I think would have been much clearer if it had been 
intent to assault with a deadly weapon is a crime. But that is a 
tough question to answer." 
24. In response to defendant's counsel's statement set 
forth in paragraph 23 above, the court repeated the answer it had 
unilaterally given to the jury. See paragraph 18, above. 
25. After the court's repetition of it's answer, referred 
to in paragraph 24 above, the prosecutor asserted'that the context 
was clear. 
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26. That shortly after the jury had received the new 
instruction set forth in paragraph 18 above, the court was notified 
that the jury had reached a decision. 
27. The jury was returned to the court and informed the 
court that it had reached a verdict of guilty and that the verdict 
was unanimous. 
28. That prior to receipt of the court's new instruction 
set forth in paragraph 18 above, the jury had been unable to reach a 
unanimous decision. See Affidavit of Barbara Brown, paragraph 9. 
29. That at least one juror felt that the court, through 
it's new instruction as set forth in paragraph 18 above, was 
directing the jury how to decide. See Affidavit of Barbara Brown, 
paragraph 12. 
30. That based upon the court's new instruction as set 
forth in paragraph 18 above, the jury concluded that intent to 
possess a deadly weapon was enough and no longer discussed the issue 
of whether or not the defendant had intended to assault any person. 
See Affidavit of Barbara Brown, paragraphs 11 and 13. 
31. That it was only after the receipt of the court's new 
instruction as set forth in paragraph 18 above, that the jury was 
able to reach a unanimous verdict of guilty. See Affidavit of 
Barbara Brown, paragraph 14. 
32. That the defendant was sentenced before this court on 
October 30, 1992. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE JURY WAS IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE LAW 
THAT APPLIED IN THIS CASE, 
Robert Lucero was charged by information with Possession of 
A Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault, a Class A Misdemeanor/ in 
violation of Utah Code Ann,, §76-10-507 (1953). The substance of 
the allegation is that Robert Lucero did have upon his person a 
dangerous weapon with the intent to unlawfully assault another. The 
jury was fully instructed on the elements of this offense, which 
instruction was sent into the jury room to help them with their 
deliberations. See Instruction No. 15. 
Subsequent to the jury's indication to the court that they 
were having difficulty reaching a unanimous decision, the court 
further instructed the jury on the crime of Possession of a Deadly 
Weapon with Intent to Assault. This further instruction was the 
result of the following question and answer. 
JURY'S QUESTION: Is intent against the law? 
COURT'S ANSWER: It is illegal to possess a deadly weapon 
with intent to assault. Intent without a deadly weapon is 
not illegal. 
This further instruction on the elements of the crime was given 
without consultation with the defendant, the defendant's counsel or 
the prosecutor. The court's answer was submitted to the jury 
without discussion. 
It is axiomatic that any instruction given to the jury must 
be a correct statement of law and when instructing on a particular 
crime must contain all essential elements for the commission of the 
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crime. See State v. Anderson, 498 P.2d 295, 299 (Mont. 1972) (jury 
instruction was incorrect statement of law and confusing to jury, 
therefore defendant was entitled to a new trial); State v. Byers, 
768 P.2d 414 (Ore. App. 1989) (defendant was entitled to a new trial 
based on error in a verdict form submitted to a jury which 
incorrectly stated one element of the substantive crime) and State 
v. Cathey, 741 P.2d 738 (Kan. 1987) (jury instructions which are 
erroneous and misleading can constitute grounds for a new trial) 
The court's answer to the jury's inquiry as to whether 
intent was against the law was an incorrect statement of the law. 
The court neglected to clearly outline to the jury the additional 
requirement that "intent to assault" must also be established. The 
court's instruction allowed the jury to determine guilt based solely 
upon an intent to possess a deadly weapon, thus, misleading the jury 
as to all essential elements required for the substantive crime. 
See Affidavit of Barbara Brown. The correct response to the jury's 
inquiry would have been to direct the jury's attention to the jury 
instructions, which fully set forth all elements required for the 
commission of the crime. 
The prosecution has alleged that the court's answer 
adequately stated all elements of the substantive offense and 
therefore was a correct statement of the law. The basis for the 
prosecutor's argument is that the context of the court's answer was 
clear. The prosecution claims that even though the court dropped 
the reference to "intent to assault" in its final pronouncement of 
the law, it is not confusing to the jury because "intent to assault" 
was mentioned above and therefore could be inferred below. Yet, 
even the court was not absolutely clear on the import of its 
answer. For example, when confronted with the 
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omission of "intent to assault" the court replied, "[I] assumed what 
we're talking [about] was intent to assault." Both the prosecutor 
and judge have the advantage of a legal background and years of 
experience with evaluating elements of a crime. Unfortunately, the 
jurors lack this level of sophistication and probably did not 
"assume" anything. Therefore, the court's answer must be read as it 
was interpreted by the jury. See Affidavit of Barbara Brown. 
Adding to the confusion, is the fact that the court's 
answer was stated in the negative. Transfering that answer to an 
affirmative statement of the law results in "Intent and a deadly 
weapon is illegal." Thus, leading the jury to conclude that intent 
to possess a deadly weapon was sufficient for conviction. See 
Affidavit of Barbara Brown, paragraphs 11 and 13. 
Furthermore, contrary to the prosecutor's position, the 
reference to "intent to assault" in the enumeration of the crime 
involved, does not necessarily follow through as a required element 
of the offenes. Note, that the first sentence of the court's answer 
was couched in the language of the name of the crime (i.e. It is 
illegal to Possessfion of] a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault). 
To illustrate the confusion created by the court's answer, 
substitute the phrase "substantive crime" in place of Possession of 
a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault and the full effect of the 
court's erroneous instruction is obvious. This substitution results 
in the answer: "It is illegal to [commit] the substantive crime. 
Intent without a deadly weapon is not illegal." Stated in the 
affirmative, the result is even clearer,—"It is illegal to [commit] 
the substantive crime. Intent and a deadly weapon is illegal." 
-8 -
The court's instruction to the jury that "intent without a 
deadly weapon is not illegal, was clearly erroneous and prejudicial. 
See Affidavit of Barbara Brown. Therefore, defendant is entitled to 
a new trial. 
II. THE COURT IMPROPERLY COMMUNICATED WITH THE 
JURY IN VIOLATION OF RULE 17(m) OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
At all times prior to the court's answering the jury's 
question regarding whether intent was against the law, the court 
properly called the defendant, the defendant's counsel and the 
prosecutor into the court and discussed on the record proposed 
answers to the jury's inquiries. The proper procedure for 
instructing the jury is set forth in Rule 17(m) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and is as follows: 
After the jury has retired for deliberation, if 
they desire to be informed on any point of law 
arising in the cause, they shall inform the 
officer in charge of them, who shall communicate 
such request to the court. The court may then 
direct that the jury be brought before the court 
where, in the presence of the defendant and both 
counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry 
or advise the jury that no further instructions 
shall be given. Such response shall be 
recorded. The court may in its discretion 
respond to the inquiry in writing without having 
the jury brought before the court, in which case 
the inquiry and the response thereto shall be 
entered into the record. 
The safeguards intended by Rule 17(m) of allowing the defendant and 
both counsel an opportunity to object to any further instruction of 
the jury was circumvented in this case by the court's unilateral 
instruction of the jury. 
At the time the parties were informed of the court's 
action, the jury had already been instructed and it was therefore 
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too late for a timely objection. As a result, the defendant has been 
required to file a Motion for a New Trial which is the only remedy 
available to him given the court's unilateral communication with the 
jury. 
Based upon the court's failure to follow the requirements 
of Rule 17(m) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the 
obvious prejudice that has resulted to the defendant, this court 
should grant defendant's Motion for a New Trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the facts outlined above, there was a reasonable 
likelihood that in the absence of the misleading and inaccurate 
instruction of the jury there would have been a different result. 
The court should grant defendant's motion for a new trial and 
correct the obvious prejudice that has resulted. 
DATED this \£ day of 
Attorney for Defendant 
November, 1992. 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON 
-10-
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the South 
Valley County Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84190-1200 this day of November, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM C 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532*5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA BROWN 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
ROBERT LUCERO, : Case No. 921002876 
HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THORNE 
Defendant. 
I, Barbara Brown, give the following affidavit based upon 
personal knowledge and under oath: 
1. That on October 2, 1992, I was impanelled as a juror in 
the above-referenced case. 
2. That upon completion of all of the evidence, myself and 
the other jurors adjourned to a jury room and began our 
deliberations. 
3. That throughout the jury deliberations, several 
questions were written out by the jury and sent to the court. 
4. That the court sent responses to the questions that 
were submitted. 
5. That approximately one hour into the deliberations, the 
jury sent a note to the court stating: "We cannot come to a 
unanimous decision. What is next?" 
6. The court responded to our note with, "Continue to 
discuss and see if you can reach a decision." 
7. That approximately two hours into the deliberations the 
jury sent the following question to the court: "Is intent against 
the law?" 
8. The court sent in a written response to the question 
outlined in paragraph 7 above, which response was as follows: "It 
is illegal to possess a deadly weapon with intent to assault. 
Intent without a deadly weapon is not illegal." 
9. That at the time of the receipt of the answer set forth 
in paragraph 8 above, the jury had been unable to reach a unanimous 
decision. 
10. That upon receipt of the answer from the court set 
forth in paragraph 8 above, the jury discussed the above-referenced 
case and how it applied to that specific instruction. 
11. That based upon the court's new instruction set forth 
in paragraph 8 above, the members of the jury concluded that it was 
enough that the defendant had intended to possess a deadly weapon 
and based upon that conclusion, found the defendant guilty. 
12. It was my personal opinion upon receipt of the 
instruction set forth in paragraph 8 above, that the court was 
directing the jury how to decide. 
13. That after receipt of the new instruction set forth in 
paragraph 8 above, there was no further discussion as to whether the 
defendant intended to assault another person, but the discussion 
focused merely upon what the court had directed the jury was 
sufficient; that is, the intent to possess a deadly weapon. 
14. Based upon the new instruction that intent to possess 
a deadly weapon was sufficient, I changed my vote from not guilty to 
guilty. 
DATED this ^^A day of November, 1992. 
TO trv^<K^w 6, 
BARBARA BROWN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
.-£ 
same. 
On the S~~ day of /y^eJf / 1992, personally 
appeared before me BARBARA BROWN, the signer of the foregoing 
instrument, who'cftr±^^^loi^^^g^^u^,Tn3 that he executed the 
2145 So. Yuma | 
IVffHSHEi Salt Lake City,.Utah 84109T / - / / / ) / s? 
lVL>Ss3P,OT My Commission E x p i r e * ? ] ^ ^ / ^ LJCa*j*JZ+ 
• V < S > y November 1. \m7r\?X^R^^ KS^**y+X~u— 
l ^ ^ y ^ State of Ut«OTA£Y PUBLIC / \ ~ ~ ~ ^ 
"Residing in:
 v J ^ / / / ^ / 6 C^>. 
My Commission Expires: //al/, / I 9*3 
/ / 
ADDENDUM D 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON, #4787 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Plaintiff, : 
v, : 
ROBERT A. LUCERO, : Case No. 921002876MS 
JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNE 
Defendant. ; 
This case came on for hearing on November 12, 1992 and 
after considering arguments of counsel and all memorandum and 
affidavits filed in support of defendant's Motion for a New Trial 
the court held as follows: 
1) That it will not consider the affidavit of Barbara 
Brown submitted in support of defendant's Motion for a New Trial on 
the grounds the affidavit sets forth facts, if considered by the 
court, that would improperly invade the deliberative processes of 
the jury. 
2. That the court's written response to the jury question 
set forth in defendant's memorandum in support of his Motion for a 
New Trial was not an improper communication with the jury and did 
not violate Rule 17 (m) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
3. That given the totality of the circumstances and taking 
all of the jury instructions as a complete whole, the court finds 
that ie the court's written response to the jury question set forth 
in defendant's memorandum in support of his Motion for a New Trial, 
was an accurate and complete statement of the law and the court 
further finds that its answer could not reasonably be viewed as 
tending to mislead the jury. 
4. Based upon the foregoing conclusions of law, 
defendant's Motion for a New Trial is denied in its entirely. 
DATED this day of February, 1993. 
•S? 
JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNE 
Third Circuit Court 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
DANET NOLAN 
Deputy County Attorney 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the South 
Valley Office of the County Attorney, 2001 South State Street, 
S3700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200, this day of February, 
1993. 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON, #4787 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
ROBERT A. LUCERO, : Case No. 921002876MS 
JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNE 
Defendant. : 
There being no legal or other reason why sentence should 
not be imposed, and the defendant have being convicted by a jury of 
the offense of Possession of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault, 
a Class A Misdemeanor and Speeding, a Class C Misdemeanor on October 
2, 1992. The Court entered sentence on October 30, 1992, where the 
defendant was sentenced to one year jail plus a $2,000.00 fine and 
$150.00 attorney recoupment fee. The Court suspended 360 days of 
the jail sentence and $1,000.00 of the fine upon 18 months probation 
with the following terms: 
1) Defendant is to comply with all the requirements of 
Adult Probation and Parole and be on probation to that agency for a 
period of 18 months. 
2) The defendant is to submit to random urinalysis as 
requested by the department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
3) The defendant is to serve five days jail, which jail 
was subsequently stayed by order of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
DATED this day of February, 1993. 
DANE NOLAN 
Deputy County Attorney 
JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNS' 
Third Circuit Court 





PATRICK L. ANDERSON 
"tbrney for, Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the South 
Valley Office of the County Attorney, 2001 South State Street, 





To convict the defendant, ROBERT A. LUCERO, of Possession 
of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault, each of the following 
elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That on or about July 14, 1992, 
2. In Salt Lake County, Utah, 
3. The defendant, ROBERT A. LUCERO, 
4. Did have upon his person a dangerous weapon with 
intent to unlawfully assault another. 
If you find from the evidence that the elements have been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to return a 
verdict of guilty. 
However, if you have a reasonable doubt as to one or more 
of the elements, it is your duty to return a verdict of not guilty. 
ADDENDUM G 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 







We, the Jurors in the above case, find the defendant 
" GUILTY" OF: POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON 
Dated /£?~d-~~ 19 ^P". 
residing Office/ 
19 
By 
Deputy Clerk 
